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The past four decades have witnessed an unprecedented shift away from state to private 
pension provision. As the unsustainability of the pay-as-you–go (PAYGO) system became 
increasingly apparent (Veall, 1986; Lambrecht, Michel and Vidal, 2005), funded non-state 
pensions started to become the main form of old age provision (Disney, 2000; Whiteford and 
Whitehouse, 2006; Perotti and Schwienbacher, 2009). In addition, as defined benefit2 (DB) 
schemes started to be replaced by defined contribution3 (DC) schemes, a further shift towards 
placing the responsibility for pension provision on individuals took place. It has been argued 
that these changes were necessary to provide a sustainable income for an aging population, and 
to stimulate economic growth and development of financial markets (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1995; Catalan et al., 2000; Vittas, 2000; Davis and Steil, 2001; Walker and Lefort, 
2001; Harichandra and Thangavelu, 2004).  However, it became increasingly clear that the 
vision of pension reform as an effective tool with which to stimulate economic and financial 
development was overly optimistic (Singh, 1996; Impravido et al., 2003; Chan-Lau, 2004; 
Roldos, 2004; Zalewska, 2006). Moreover, it transpired that funded pensions might not be able 
to fulfil their role in securing retirement income, regardless of whether the pension schemes 
were public (i.e. provided by public bodies to their employees), corporate (i.e. provided by 
corporations to their employees) or individual (i.e. provided to individual investors by financial 
institutions with or without contributions from those investors’ employers). 
There are two major drivers behind this problem. First, individuals/households have not 
been saving enough for retirement, despite the numerous changes aimed at attracting long-term 
savings commitments. Second, returns on savings are not sufficient to guarantee a comfortable 
income at retirement.  Two strands of the academic literature on pensions develop these issues. 
One is concerned with the saving attitudes and abilities of individuals. The other deals with the 
characteristics of the institutional environment. This Special Issue unites both strands, helping 
us to understand the problems that individuals face when saving for old age, and contributing 
to the debate on how to improve the retirement prospects of individuals. Some of the proposed 
solutions are country specific, but many have cross-border relevance. The common theme 
                                                            
2 Defined benefit (DB) is a pension plan in which a sponsor (often the employer) promises specified pension 
payments or a lump sum (or a combination of them) on retirement. The amount to be paid is predetermined by a 
formula that takes into account the contributor’s earnings history, tenure of service and age. 
3 Defined contribution (DC) pension plans collect money from individuals (and sometimes their 
employers/sponsors) in order to invest that money until each individual’s retirement. The amount available at 
retirement depends on the returns on these investments (after the payment of fees to the investment company 




stemming from this research is that a better institutional environment is essential if pension 
reforms are to succeed. Given the widespread evidence that individuals are unable to plan and 
manage their long-term finances, the institutional environment needs to be improved to provide 
better support for individuals and to facilitate the long-term stability of the pension system. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: first, we set out the arguments for 
pension reform and the introduction of funded pension schemes. A successful pension system 
requires individuals to save and make appropriate financial decisions within a sound 
institutional structure. So, we go on to discuss why individuals find it difficult to commit to a 
savings regime sufficient for their retirement and to make sound, long-term financial decisions. 
We then review the evidence on whether institutional investors have been adequately 
supporting individuals in their efforts to secure retirement income, and explore the factors that 
may have contributed to those outcomes currently observed. We close with a summary and 





 The structures of pension systems in many developed countries are the result of 
centuries of evolution. For instance, in the UK, the tradition of occupational pensions goes back 
to the thirteenth century and the industrial revolution had a significant impact on the sector’s 
growth and development. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the within-industry focus of 
occupational pensions can be traced back to the country’s powerful guild houses in the 
seventeenth century. In France and Germany, on other hand, the dominant position of the state 
and its role in providing social security have played a significant role in the relative 
underdevelopment of corporate and personal pensions. In many developing countries, the 
structure of the funded pension industry has been established only in the last few decades as 
part of fundamental market reforms (e.g. in the post-Soviet countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe). Therefore, the structures of pension industries are country specific, with some systems 
relying heavily on DB occupational pensions while others are dominated by DC personal 
schemes.4 
In the 1980s, when the issue of an aging population, additionally magnified by the 
presence of ‘baby boomers’, started to surface, many countries with large occupational DB 
                                                            
4 See Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) for a discussion of the political origins of pension funding. 
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schemes started to reform their systems to reduce the proportion of DB schemes and replace 
them with DC schemes (e.g. 401(k) schemes in the US, personal pension schemes in the UK 
and the KiwiSaver scheme in New Zealand) or some hybrids of DB and DC schemes (e.g. the 
Netherlands). Academics supported this movement, stressing the benefits of funded pension 
schemes (Samwick and Skinner, 2004; Börsch-Supan, 2005; Poterba et al., 2007; Andersen 
and Bhattacharya, 2017) and advising on the best ways of transforming the pension industry 
(Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Feldstein, 2005; Miles and Černý, 2006; Døskeland and Nordahl, 
2008; Broeders and Chen, 2010; Cocco and Gomes, 2012; Shi and Werker, 2012; Aggarwal 
and Goodell, 2013), but also pointing out certain weak elements of the newly introduced 
reforms (Poterba et al., 1995; Disney, 2000; Lachance et al., 2003; Lindbeck and Persson, 
2003; Brown, 2008; Maurer, 2015; Fabozzi, 2015; Zalewska, 2017). 
Parallel to the research focused on economy-wide consequences, a separate strand of 
research investigated the impact of pension reform on individuals. Here, the support for reform 
seemed less strong. For instance, there is evidence that a reduction of pension benefits, an 
increase in the retirement age or an increase in uncertainty with regard to retirement benefits 
negatively affect individuals.  Montizaan et al. (2016) show that a reduction in pension rights 
reduced the motivation of Dutch workers. De Grip et al. (2012) argue that the introduction of 
a requirement to work one additional year in order to maintain pension rights or retire at the 
pre-reform age with reduced benefits had a negative impact on Dutch workers’ mental health. 
Haverstick et al. (2010) provide evidence that the replacement of DB by DC schemes reduced 
American workers’ commitment to their jobs. They show that workers with between five and 
ten years of tenure at a firm were 23 percent more likely to leave a job offering a DC plan than 
one offering a DB plan. Gerrans and Clark (2013) suggest that age plays an important role in 
voluntary switching from DB to DC schemes, with older workers being more negative about 
switching than younger workers. This finding is consistent with Schrager (2009), who argues 
that younger workers may feel more positively inclined towards DC schemes than older 
workers because they have potentially higher expected job turnover and wage variability. 
Consequently, to encourage individuals to switch from DB to DC schemes, some 
regulators have introduced guarantees of minimum pension payments/rate of return for DC 
schemes. Lachance et al. (2003) discuss a hypothetical fair price of an option permitting DC 
plan participants to buy back their DB benefit. They show that the market value of such an 
option could constitute up to 100 percent of DC contributors’ working life contributions, which 
sheds some light on the potential cost of avoiding the risk that contributors face in DC schemes. 
Obviously, strong preferences for DB schemes partly rely on the expectation that such 
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schemes’ providers will be able to keep their promises. There are, therefore, good reasons for 
ensuring that DB schemes recover from the financial shortfalls they are currently facing. 
However, the financial soundness of DB schemes should not be taken for granted as 
these shortfalls are considerable. For instance, the deficit of public US DB schemes alone 
reached $3.8 trillion in mid-2017,5  which is equivalent to over 25 percent of the value of all 
the investments of US pension funds.6 In the UK, DB scheme underfunding—at £0.9 trillion 
in mid-2016—was equivalent to approximately 50 percent of all UK pension funds’ 
investments.7   
Potential problems with the funding of DB schemes have been discussed for decades. 
It is recognised that the level of contributions should be aligned with the promised benefits 
(see, e.g. Huberman and Sung, 1994, 2005; Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero, 2004, 2006) 
and that contributions should be smoothed over time to help sponsors with financial decisions 
(Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). Boes and Siegman (2017) propose adopting nominal loss-aversion 
in an adjustment mechanism. They propose introducing an intergenerational insurance fund 
that would mitigate potential shortfalls of pension outcomes relative to a reference point of 
retirement benefits while insurance premiums would be collected only in situations where 
intermediate pension wealth was at an all-time high. They argue that designing a pension 
system that uses a high-water mark for insurance contributions would avoid nominal decreases 
in pension capital, and would also avoid direct transfers between active contributors and those 
already retired. Consequently, this new system would help to restore individuals’ confidence 
in the DB scheme and impact positively on participation. 
Boosting participation and trust in the system is fundamental for the success of pension 
reforms.  Even though the funded pension industry has grown significantly, the need for 
increased coverage and additional savings is still enormous. According to the OECD (2016), 
the value of the assets of private pension funds in 20 OECD countries and 24 non-OECD 
countries reached, collectively, $38 trillion (or 51 percent of world GDP) in 2015. Yet this is 
dwarfed by the shortfall in the world’s pension budget. According to a report by Citi (2016), 
the 20 largest OECD countries alone have, collectively, a $78 trillion shortfall in funding 
PAYGO and DB public pensions’ obligations. This shortfall is nearly 1.8 times the value of 
their published collective national debt. So if DC schemes are to develop further, it is essential 
                                                            
5 “US faces crisis as pension funding hole hits $3.85tn”, Financial Times, 15 May 2017. 
6 According to the OECD (2016), the total investment of US pension funds was $14.25 trillion in 2015. 
7 “UK’s pension funding hole hits £900bn after Brexit”, Financial Times. 26 June 2016. The OECD (2016) reports 
that UK pension funds’ investments amounted £1.82 trillion in 2015. 
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that individuals’ participation, long-term commitment and ability to make adequate financial 
decisions are strong. The next section discusses the barriers to achieving this. 
 
  
3. Individual investors 
 
3.1. Myopia and financial literacy 
 
The economic literature on time preferences recognises that individuals may invest too 
little, either because they are myopic or, even when they do recognise the time inconsistency 
of preferences, because they face constraints induced by their own future choices. This means 
that individuals’ resistance to saving for old age may be part of human nature, and that if this 
is so, appropriate policies need to be put in place to encourage individuals to plan for retirement. 
Therefore, it is important to understand what forms of encouragement—and under what 
conditions—are most effective in promoting participation in pension schemes and whether the 
solutions that have been adopted are effective. 
Although it is widely recognised that individuals need a bit of a ‘push’ to start saving for 
old age, there is no consensus as to the form such a push should take. Indeed, different countries 
have adopted different degrees of intervention. While in some countries contributions to funded 
pension schemes remain voluntary (e.g. in the UK and the US), in others they are 
predominantly mandatory (e.g. in the Netherlands, Chile and Poland) or quasi-mandatory (e.g. 
Denmark).8 However, even in countries where, historically, contributing to funded pensions 
has been voluntary, automatic enrolment has started to gain ground, with the aim of offsetting 
the resistance of individuals with regard to retirement savings and of increasing savings rates. 
Biljanovska and Palligkinis (2017) strongly support the idea of automated transfers to 
saving accounts as a valuable tool for helping households commit to the plans they themselves 
have made.  They also argue that providing households with adequate and comprehensible 
financial information is important for households’ financial planning, as it supports their ability 
to plan, monitor and commit to pre-set goals. Moreover, they assert that it is important that 
individuals are taught how to plan, as the ability to plan is essential in setting goals and 
achieving them. Biljanovska and Palligkinis’ (2017) research provides a valuable extension to 
the earlier research on how to motivate individuals to save for old age and how effective the 
                                                            
8 In Denmark, contributions to occupational pension schemes are not mandatory by law, as employers contribute 
only voluntarily to pension funds. In practice, however, such contributions are rendered mandatory thanks to the 
collective, mainly industry-wide, agreements that exist between social partners. 
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chosen methods are. For instance, Madrian and Shea (2001) document that automatic 
enrolment significantly increased the rates of participation in 401(k) schemes. However, the 
authors also highlight a high level of passivity among investors, showing—for example—that 
although automatic enrolment increased participation rates, automatically enrolled individuals 
did not adjust the saving rates and allocations initially established by their employers. This 
tendency to go for default options is also documented by Clark et al. (2016), who study the 
2011 pension reform in the state of Utah (USA). They find that over 60 percent of employees 
affected by the reform did not choose their pension plan in an active manner, and consequently 
ended up with the default option. Those ‘inactive’ employees were also less likely to enrol in 
any supplementary pension scheme. 
Following from this argument, and given the inherent resistance of individuals to saving 
for the future and the tendency to postpone such decisions, it is of vital importance that we 
understand what institutional environment could be created to motivate individuals to start 
saving and to support them in their saving commitments.9 To achieve such an understanding, 
it is important to understand both the decision-making processes of households and individuals 
and their responsiveness to particular forms of ‘external’ help. El-Attar and Poschke (2011) 
highlight the importance of trust. Iyengar and Kamenica (2010) and Goldreich and Hałaburda 
(2013) stress the importance of the manner in which the relevant information is presented to 
individuals. They argue in favour of simplicity and understandability. Cobb-Clark et al. (2016) 
provide evidence that having an ‘external’ person delegated to look after retirement savings is 
less effective than households having an ‘internal’ person responsible for the task. Stolper 
(2017) sheds new light on this matter. He highlights the importance of a personalised approach 
to individuals if one wishes to influence their financial decision-making and commitments. 
Standardised financial advice is not effective in motivating individuals to make financial 
decisions. The author finds that two-thirds of his sample of 6,000 German households 
completely ignored the financial advice given to them, and that those who took that advice into 
account followed it to only a limited degree. Stolper (2017) observes that financial literacy if 
anything makes individuals less likely to pay attention to standardised advice, which further 
highlights the inadequacy of a standardised approach. 
The importance and impact of financial literacy on investment behaviour and attitudes is 
another important strand of the pensions literature. As it is recognised that the level of financial 
literacy is low, even in developed countries, in which the general level of education is high 
                                                            
9 A comprehensive discussion of other important aspects of household finance can be found in Haliassos (2015). 
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(see, e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006, 2007, 2011; Lusardi et al., 2014; Atkinson and Messy, 
2011; van Rooij et al., 2011; Dushi and Honig, 2015; Lusardi and Tufano, 2015),10 two strands 
of research lead the field: one is concerned with factors affecting financial literacy (e.g. Sundén 
and Surette, 1998; Gamble et al., 2015; Finke et al., 2017) and the other with its effects and 
consequences (e.g. Alexander et al., 1998; Bailey et al., 2011; Korniotis and Kumar, 2011; 
Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer, 2014; Guiso and Viviano, 2015; Grinblatt et al., 2015). In 
the context of retirement savings, it is well understood that financial literacy is positively 
correlated with wealth and the quality of financial decision-making. The positive impact on 
wealth at retirement is achieved through better retirement planning (see, e.g. Almenberg and 
Säve-Söderbergh, 2011; Fornero and Monticone, 2011; Sekita, 2011) and a comparatively 
higher proportion of equity investments (see van Rooij et al., 2012), better market timing skills 
(see Guiso and Viviano, 2015), a better understanding of, and a higher sensitivity to, changes 
in investment risk (see Bateman et al., 2014, 2016) and better international diversification (see 
Bekaert et al., 2017). Jappelli and Padula (2015) stress the importance of financial literacy 
being achieved early in life. 
Many studies do not directly test for the effects of financial literacy as data on the 
financial literacy of individuals are hard to obtain (see, e.g. Bekaert et. al., 2017), instead using 
the size of salaries and seniority of posts as proxies for it. Conclusions from this research are 
consistent with the notion that financial literacy matters, statistically and economically. For 
instance, Agnew et al. (2003) argue that male, higher-income and higher-seniority individuals 
invest more in equity. Agnew (2006) concludes that higher-salaried individuals are better at 
diversification. He claims that they invest less in their employers’ stock, and are less likely to 
adopt ‘naïve’ diversification—that is, to invest equal proportions in the assets included in their 
401(k) portfolios. Interestingly, Agnew (2006) also finds that women make better choices than 
do men. However, given the pay gap between men and women, it is possible that the $100,000 
earning threshold used in the study may have resulted in the selection of much more educated 
women than men in the same earning categories, which may have driven the result. 
Despite the changing pensions environment and efforts made to improve individual 
investors’ awareness, the level of financial literacy and the understanding of the specifics of 
personal finance in the general population remain low, and do not seem to be improving over 
time. Alessie et al. (2011) conclude that financial literacy did not improve in the Netherlands 
                                                            




between 2005 and 2010. Dushi and Honing (2015) study perceptions of DC contributions in 
three cohorts over a longer time horizon. They look at individuals who were aged between 51 
and 56—that is to say, 10‒15 years short of retirement, in 1992, 1998 and 2004. They conclude 
that regardless of the time differences and the level of coverage of DC schemes (which 
increased considerably between 1992 and 2004), the three cohorts significantly and 
comparably overestimated their level of DC contributions. In particular, the absolute difference 
between respondent-reported and social security earnings record contributions was 
approximately 1.5 times larger than the mean contribution in the earnings records. 
Given that the level of financial literacy is important for sound financial decision-
making—but that it has been and is likely to remain low—it is imperative to ask what the 
possible consequences of developing a pension system that produces retirement incomes 
heavily dependent on individuals’ investment decisions are. Ahmed et al. (2017) offer an 
important insight into this issue. They study the potential wealth effects of giving investors the 
freedom to decide when and in which assets to invest, as opposed to enforcing an ‘imposed’ 
50‒50 allocation between equity and bonds. They argue that giving investors the freedom of 
investment can deliver superior performance only when these investors have the ‘knowledge, 
skills and discipline to select optimal investment portfolios’. They argue that limiting 
investment choices is preferable, given that such skills and commitment cannot be expected 
from the average investor. In particular, their simulations show that the risk of the potential 
retirement income from the private retirement account (PRA) system falling below that 
currently promised by the US Social Security System is nearly 35 percent at the age of 68 when 
individuals are given the freedom to decide with regard to what equity they invest in and to the 
proportions of their portfolios allocated to bonds and equity. In contrast, the risk is less than 18 
percent when individuals invest in the ‘standardised’ 50‒50 portfolio of equity and bond 
indexes. 
 
3.2. Investor behaviour 
 
While a standardised investment allocation may be better than the ‘erratic’ decisions of 
poorly informed individuals, the question of what is the best standardised asset allocation 
remains an open one. In this section, we discuss the literature concerned with (i) optimal and 




It is commonly accepted that long-term and short-term investment strategies should 
differ from one another; however, there is little consensus as to what they should be. It is also 
commonly accepted that optimal retirement investments are not straightforward and may be 
determined by many factors (see, e.g. Campbell and Viceira, 2002; Love, 2013; Cochrane, 
2014). Bagliano et al. (2014) add to the debate by pointing out that the commonly accepted 
positive relationship between individuals’ portfolio proportions invested in risky assets and 
their  time to retirement may not hold when there is uncertainty about social security pensions 
and labour income. The authors argue that when individuals suffer labour income shocks and 
cannot rely on state pensions to support them upon their retirement, they should increase their 
allocation in risky assets before retiring. Further, Menoncin and Scaillet (2003) show that it is 
optimal for individuals to maintain or even increase equity holdings during the early years of 
their retirement. They argue that the proportion of bond holdings should decline over time 
during the accumulation and, especially, during the decumulation years, while the proportion 
of bonds held in risk-free assets should increase.11 Therefore, as reliance on DC schemes 
increases, it is important to understand the investment practices of individual investors in order 
to ascertain whether they diverge from theoretical predictions. 
 There is plenty of evidence that individuals struggle with the idea of active investment 
and asset diversification, and that those who have better investment skills enjoy better returns 
(Dahlquist et al., 2017). Not surprisingly, individuals prefer DB to DC schemes and show little 
initiative with respect to making conscious investment decisions (see, Haverstick et al., 2010; 
Gerrans and Clark, 2013; Clark et al., 2016). They also shy away from equity investments. 
Gustman et al. (2010) document that Americans aged 53 to 58 in 2006 had only 15.2 percent 
of their wealth in stock held directly, in DC plans, or in individual retirement accounts (IRAs). 
Farrell and Shoag (2016) find that the asset allocation of individual investors’ DC schemes is 
similar to that of the DB schemes offered by their (public body) employers, although one can 
expect that the risks associated with DB and DC schemes, respectively, are fundamentally 
different. Benartzi et al. (2007) confirm the inefficient asset allocation of 401(k) accounts and, 
in particular, their weak diversification. They claim that some 11 million contributors 
voluntarily invest at least 20 percent of their retirement savings in their employer’s stock. 
The problems with appropriate decision-making do not stop on the day of retirement. 
Deciding how to convert retirement savings into streams of retirement income is both important 
                                                            
11 Accumulation refers to the period during which contributions are collected, decumulation to the period during 
which pensions are being paid. 
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and nontrivial. The fact that financial literacy declines with age (Fernandes et al., 2014; Gamble 
et al., 2015) potentially adds to the problem. Hubener et al.’s (2014) model of optimal asset 
allocation suggests that couples should rely heavily on joint annuities. Koijen et al. (2011) also 
support this dominant position of annuities, but stress that given that annuities are not risk free 
and depend on the state of the economy, households should allocate their savings to nominal, 
inflation-linked, and variable annuities. 
Although theory predicts that individuals ought to find annuities attractive, the 
empirical evidence shows that this is not necessarily the case, and measures aimed at 
‘smoothing’ retirement income do not seem to appeal to households. Inkmann et al. (2011) find 
that the demand for annuities is positively related to life expectancy, financial wealth and 
education. Moreover, that demand depends on the existence of other retirement income and on 
the probability of a bequest to a surviving spouse. Benartzi et al. (2011) confirm that the 
demand for annuities is driven by many factors and that the observed low levels of annuitisation 
may not reflect the true preferences of individuals, being driven instead by the institutional 
environment and institutional constraints. 
The influence of the investment environmental on individuals’ decision-making sheds 
additional light on our understanding of the investment abilities and practices of individual 
investors, and it may not be entirely individuals’ ‘fault’ if their decisions appear ‘irrational’. 
First, it is important to recognise that decisions to save depend on economic and market 
conditions (see, e.g. Acemoglu and Scott, 1994; Ludvigson, S.C., 2004). Second, risk attitudes 
are also, to some extent, the result of these external conditions. For instance, trust is one of the 
fundamental factors that explains participation in financial markets (see, e.g. Ballock et al., 
2015; Ricci and Caratelli, 2017). El-Attar and Poschke (2011) show that households with lower 
trust invest more in housing and less in financial assets, especially those that are more risky. 
This is consistent with the argument, raised by Cao et al. (2011), that under-diversification, and 
hence home and local bias, can be explained by individuals’ ‘fear of change and uncertainty’. 
Consistent with this argument, Lindblom et al. (2017) find that native locals (i.e. locals who 
were born in the district they live in) are almost three times more locally biased than other 
locals (i.e. residents of a district who were born outside that district) in terms of their average 
equity investments. In particular, place of birth is an important determinant of the portfolio 
choice of individual investors born in urban districts. However, this local or birthplace bias 
does not affect the performance of investments. The authors document abnormal returns for 
sophisticated investors—that is, those who held more diversified portfolios—regardless of 
whether those investors were birthplace-biased or not. 
12 
 
A high level of bias towards ‘familiar’ assets is also well documented for 401(k) 
investments (e.g. Benartzi, 2001; Benartzi et al., 2007). While some blame individuals for this 
obvious lack of diversification (see, e.g. Tang et al., 2010), others point the finger at the 
behaviour of employers and at the options offered to employees. In particular, Rauh (2006) 
shows that there was a significant decline in holdings of employers’ stock in Delaware (USA) 
following the validation of poison pills and staggered boards by the state. This suggests that 
the ‘voluntary’ holding of employers’ stocks may be the result of encouragements pursued by 
employers themselves. Elton et al. (2006) blame employers for creating inadequate investment 
opportunities within 401(k) schemes. They argue that only 53 percent of the plans offer an 
adequate set of options and that over a 20-year period offering inadequate options makes a 
difference in terminal wealth of over 53 percent. Further, Elton et al. (2007) argue that 
restrictions imposed by retirement savings plans that limit employees to investing in one fund 
family are likely to result in significant wealth loss. They show that within-family funds have 
higher correlations than across-family funds, and—therefore—increase the risk of investments 
and reduce diversification benefits. 
It is also well recognised that individual investors are sensitive to how and what 
information is presented to them (see, e.g. Bateman et al., 2014, 2016). Iyengar and Kamenica 
(2010) argue that giving people many investment options, especially when they do not 
understand them, will result in simpler options being chosen. In other words, the number of 
options available may affect the quality of the decisions made. Presenting investment 
opportunities in a simple—that is to say, understandable—manner is critical for informed 
decision-making. The authors conclude that investment risk is not the main investment criterion 
for individual investors. Individuals choose fixed-income and money market funds rather than 
equity funds because, when faced with many investment options that they do not understand, 
they prefer simple options. Also, Huberman and Jiang (2006) find that individuals invest evenly 
across different types of funds and are not sensitive to the investment opportunities they are 
offered, tending to invest in only three to four funds regardless of the number of funds available 
to them (which, in their study, varies between 4 and 59). 
 It seems, therefore, that employers would be doing a better job if they offered a small 
range of well-diversified options rather than a wide range of options that investors simply do 
not understand, and consequently shy away from. Educating individuals about their rights and 
opportunities creates a positive attitude towards saving and investing for old age (see, e.g. 
Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2011). It is thus of vital importance that individuals, 
who—by nature—find committing to long-term savings, understanding financial concepts, and 
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comprehending available investment options difficult, get appropriate support in planning and 
investing for old age. Here, institutional investors have an important role to play, and the next 
section discusses the current state of knowledge on the subject. 
 
 
4. Institutional investors 
 
Institutional investors represent individual investors in the sense that they make investment 
decisions and invest on the latter’s behalf. In the case of DB schemes, individuals do not need 
to be directly involved in the decision-making process with regard to which assets savings 
should be invested in in order to deliver a retirement income determined by salary (final or 
average) and years of contributions. Theoretically, the responsibility for ensuring that pension 
liabilities do not exceed the value of accumulated assets remains with the sponsor. In practice, 
depending on the nature of the sponsor—that is, whether they are public or corporate, and the 
manner in which pension assets are protected should a sponsor go bankrupt—the responsibility 
for the underfunding of DB schemes may spread far beyond a pension’s sponsor and its 
employees. 
In the case of DC schemes, the effects of investment decisions are fully passed on to 
individual investors, but it is not always the case that investment decisions are solely in the 
hands of those same individual investors. In some DC pension plans (e.g. self-
invested personal pensions in the UK), individuals have a relatively high level of involvement 
in investment decision-making, while in others (e.g. NEST portfolios available in the UK to 
small and medium-sized companies and to the self-employed), they can only choose from a 
narrow range of portfolios run by asset management companies that offer pension schemes. 
Individual investors often also have limited monitoring rights. 
Regardless of whether a pension scheme is DB or DC, institutional investors should act 
in the best interests of their clients. In the case of DB schemes, this implies a ‘sufficient’ rate 
of return to guarantee that pension schemes can meet obligations, and in the case of DC 
schemes that the expected returns do not fall short of those promised when the contract was 
signed. Additional constraints on investment objectives might occur in the case of DC schemes 
with minimum-rate-of-return guarantees. There is, therefore, no reason to expect that the 
investment objectives and practices of DB and DC schemes will be similar, or that similar rates 
of return can be achieved by each type of scheme. Moreover, in an additional layer of 
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complexity, there may be considerable differences in the factors that determine the quality of 
the services provided. 
Regardless of the scheme’s form, there is always the possibility that asset managers 
will not act in the best interests of their clients. To a certain extent, the problems arising from 
the separation of pension management and pension rights are similar to the agency conflicts 
discussed in the corporate governance literature. Pension managers have their own objectives, 
which may be driven by short-term preferences, while contributors may have a more long-term 
focus. 
Numerous papers have been written on how to define the objective functions of 
institutional investors and the constraints they face. Here, we focus on a discussion of issues 
relevant in the context of pension investments.12 First, we summarise the optimal asset 
allocation literature, then we discuss empirical papers that document the investment strategies 
and asset allocation of pension funds. 
 
4.1. Optimal asset allocation 
 
It is commonly accepted that optimal asset allocation should involve a mix of asset classes 
with different risk characteristics (often stocks and bonds), although there is little agreement as 
to the exact proportions and how these vary over time. Keeping the value of pension assets 
close to the value of pension liabilities seems a natural recommendation for DB schemes. 
Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) argue that DB schemes should construct two portfolios, one 
replicating pension liabilities, the other a growth portfolio for the surplus. 
Hainaut and Deelstra (2011) recognise that the level of underfunding affects optimal 
investment decisions. In particular, they postulate that an underfunded fund should take a short 
position in cash and invest it in bonds and equity. Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2010) 
come to a similar conclusion, and argue that when underfunding is significant it may be optimal 
to increase the risk of investments by borrowing money and investing it in bonds and stocks. 
The relative proportions of bonds and stocks depend on their correlation. Josa-Fombellida and 
Rincón-Zapatero (2012) further stress that ‘topping up’ underfunded schemes should be 
accompanied by increased risk-taking with regard to asset allocation. In periods of financial 
distress, however, going short with cash in order to finance pensions may not always be 
                                                            
12 For surveys of the optimisation literature, see Sundaresan (2000) and Brandt (2010). 
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feasible. Indeed, if a sponsor’s poor corporate performance and poor pension investment 
performance coincide, low-risk pension investments may seem more appropriate (Broeders, 
2010). Similarly, a sponsor’s preference for low-risk investments may be driven by its desire 
to build financial slack, especially in times of financial hardship. Bodie et al. (1987) argue that 
if a sponsor wants to build up financial reserves, investing in high-liquidity assets seems 
reasonable and that this will lead to low-risk investment strategies. Moreover, increased risk-
taking by financially distressed sponsors may not be a sign that sound investment decisions are 
being taken. Given that it is common to have an external protection system that offers some 
kind of guarantee of a minimum pension, sponsors facing bankruptcy and/or the closure of a 
pension scheme may have an incentive to engage in risk-shifting by adopting more risky 
investment strategies (see, e.g. Sharpe, 1976; Treynor, 1977; Harrison and Sharpe, 1983). 
Additional difficulties arise when pension funds close the door to new investors. Such funds 
cannot benefit from intergenerational risk sharing or from having members with heterogeneous 
investment horizons, indexation preferences and investment policies. Battocchio et al. (2007) 
argue that the investment strategies employed for the accumulation and decumulation phases, 
respectively, need to be considered jointly, although each may be different. The authors 
confirm the traditional wisdom that the allocation in risky assets should decline during the 
accumulation phase, but claim that the opposite is true during the decumulation phase—that is 
to say, that investment in risky assets should increase over time since members’ anticipated 
future life spans decline.  They also argue that, given their assertion that the investment 
strategies of the accumulation and decumulation phases should be considered jointly, it is 
important that funds that are closed to new contributors are run by the same type of 
management during their decumulation phase as ran them during their accumulation phase. For 
instance, if a closed fund was internally managed during its accumulation phase, it should 
remain internally managed during its decumulation phase. Further, investment strategies 
depend on a fund’s level of funding, and therefore should not, the authors state, rely on 
externally taken decisions that ignore the current state of the fund. In other words, asset 
management should not be outsourced during either phase. 
In the case of DC schemes, the main factors discussed in the literature as affecting 
optimal asset allocation strategies include uncertainty regarding the inflow of cash 
contributions during the accumulation stage, the longevity of individuals, uncertainty about 
interest rates, and the form of pension benefits to be adopted at the retirement date (see, e.g. 
Boulier et al., 2001; Deelstra et al., 2000; Cairns et al., 2006). The more non-deterministic 
factors in a model, the more complex optimal trading strategies become. For instance, to 
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replicate the optimal asset allocation, Cairns et al. (2006) show that when interest rates are 
deterministic, it is sufficient to use two efficient mutual funds—one dominated by equity to fit 
the risk preferences of investors, the other dominated by cash to hedge the salary risk. If 
stochastic interest rates are introduced, it becomes necessary to enrich the optimal asset 
allocation by adding a fund that hedges against interest rate risk. The authors also argue that 
although cash and bonds can both be considered low-risk investments, given their different 
hedging properties they should not be treated as ‘close’ substitutes; rather, cash should be 
replaced by bonds over time.  
Gao (2008), on the other hand, concludes that when the terminal value of the portfolio 
is to be maximised, the optimal asset allocation strategy is to decrease investments in stocks 
(slightly) and bonds (aggressively) and to increase the proportion of risk-free investments. Han 
and Hung (2012) come to a very similar conclusion, differing only in that they also have an 
indexed bond as a fourth potential investment instrument. They conclude that the proportion 
invested in the risk-free asset and indexed bonds should increase over time. They allow for 
cash borrowing to finance these investments, and construct an example that allows the 
proportion of borrowed cash in the initial portfolio to reach as high as -40 percent. 
While some postulate that taking more risks may be beneficial, and even desirable, 
warnings with regard to risk-shifting remain valid. In particular, the presence of external 
guarantees may induce moral hazard and result in more risky strategies (Romaniuk, 2007). 
 
4.2.  Investment strategies in practice 
 
The performance of DB asset managers has attracted a fair amount of research, with some 
documenting poor performance (see, e.g. Beebower and Bergstrom, 1977; Blake et al., 1999, 
2002; Clare, Cuthbertson and Nitzsche, 2010) and some claiming that asset managers do a good 
job (see, e.g. Brown et al., 1997; de Haan and Kakes, 2011; Aglietta et al., 2012). 
While it can be argued that sponsors should have regard for the financial soundness of their 
pension schemes, it is well recognised that in practice this may not be entirely true. Distortions 
may arise from the misalignment of pension fund managers’ preferences with those of the 
funds’ contributors, but they may also result from official policies or from the regulatory 
framework. Such distortions may lead to increased or decreased risk-taking by sponsors. 
For instance, a tax system may create arbitrage opportunities and, hence, incentives for 
lower risk-taking by sponsors. Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) argue that, in the case of US 
corporations, it may be optimal to invest entirely in fixed-income securities to maximise tax 
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arbitrage opportunities. Frank (2002) shows that corporations’ decision to invest DB assets in 
bonds is consistent with this theoretical prediction. She does not find the effect in the case of 
DC schemes, where such tax benefits do not apply. 
It is also argued that accounting standards impact risk-taking and investment strategies. In 
particular, the rate used to discount pension liabilities is an important factor in determining risk 
incentives. The US is an interesting case because the discount rate used to calculate DB 
pensions’ liabilities is related to the expected rate of return on assets (see, e.g. Novy-Marx and 
Rauh, 2009, 2011; Pennacchi and Rastad, 2011; Mohan and Zhang, 2014; Novy-Marx, 2015; 
Andonov et al., 2017). Andonov et al. (2017) argue that US public pension funds, as a result 
of their incentives, invest more in risky securities than do Canadian, European and even US 
private pension funds, which are subject to different liabilities accounting rules. Moreover, they 
claim that the level of risk-taking is a positive function of the level of underfunding per 
participant and is negatively associated with fund performance. Novy-Marx and Rauh’s (2009) 
results suggest that the 2008 financial crisis cannot be blamed for the high level of public 
pensions’ underfunding observed in post-financial crisis years. The results show that, as of 
December 2008, public pensions in 50 US states were underfunded by in total approximately 
$3.23 trillion (as compared with $1.94 trillion worth of assets) when market-based discount 
rates that reflect the risk profile of the pension liabilities were adopted in the calculations.13 
Another potential influence on risk-taking is discussed by Boubaker et al. (2017). They 
look at the impact of monetary policies, and in particular of low interest rates and the decline 
in Treasury yields, on the risk-shifting behaviour of pension funds. They conclude that changes 
in Treasury yields following changes in the Fed's target interest rates coincided with a 
substantial increase in pension funds’ allocation to equities, which is consistent with structural 
risk-shifting. 
In Europe, interestingly, prolonged low interest rates have not resulted in excessive risk-
taking by pension funds. Indeed, following the financial crisis a general trend towards lowering 
investment risk set in. The Bank of England (2014) warns that ‘funding shortfalls have 
intensified (the adoption of) short-term performance measures’ with the effect that long-term 
investors are increasingly unable to invest in line with their long-term horizons’. This potential 
for overinvestment in lower-risk, fixed-income securities is itself related to pension fund 
accounting. In particular, a fund’s performance, and hence its level of funding, is tied to its 
benchmarks’ performance measured quarterly. Volatile equity markets make equity 
                                                            
13 For a discussion of discounting of pension liabilities/assets see Brown and Pennacchi (2016). 
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investments unattractive when regulation requires sponsors to maintain a high level of funding 
at all times. 
Another strand of the pensions literature is devoted to understanding the behavioural 
aspects of asset allocation and risk-taking. Some of these factors are common to public and 
corporate schemes, but others are specific to the nature of the sponsor. 
Bradleya et al. (2016) and Andonov et al. (2017) claim that state pension funds are 
politically biased and that this affects their asset allocation and risk-taking. In particular, they 
show that there is a positive relationship between the numbers of politically affiliated trustees 
on boards and risky asset allocations. Hochberg and Rauh (2013) document a bias of public 
pension funds towards in-state, ‘politically-friendly’ projects, investment in which does not 
seem justifiable by economic arguments alone. Also, Wang and Mao (2015) claim that public 
pensions’ board members use their influence to enhance their political capital, as their 
shareholder activism increases with the number of board members running for election to 
public office.14  
In the case of corporate DB schemes investment decisions are not free from distortion 
either. An et al. (2013) argue that the risk-taking of corporate DB schemes is related to 
sponsors’ default risk and underfunding of the schemes. Atanasova and Gatev (2013) argue 
that there are significant differences in the magnitude and determinants of the risk-taking of 
pension plans sponsored by publicly traded and privately held companies, respectively. The 
effect of the funding status of pension liabilities on risk-taking is two and a half times higher 
for plans with publicly traded sponsors than for plans with private sponsors. In contrast, 
changing sponsors’ contributions has a more than four times greater effect on risk-taking for 
plans with private sponsors than for plans of publicly-traded sponsors. These results suggest 
that the alignment of incentives for the stakeholders in a pension contract is different for plans 
sponsored by private and publicly-traded companies, respectively. 
 Although both corporate and public pension funds seem to take more risk when 
underfunded, Mohan and Zhang (2014) show that, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis, 
public bodies’ DB schemes undertake more risk when underfunded than do corporate pension 
funds. 
Opting for risky strategies may or may not be beneficial. Rauh (2009) concludes that risk-
taking may be associated with higher returns. He finds that poorly funded DB schemes invest 
                                                            
14 In general, corporate governance is found to play a significant role in risk-taking for both public and corporate 
DB plans (Cocco and Volpin, 2007; Phan and Hegde, 2013). 
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more in government debt and cash, while well-funded funds of highly rated companies invest 
more in equity. He argues that risk-shifting plays a considerably smaller role than the desire to 
limit costly financial distress. Dyck and Pomorski (2016) found that investing in high-risk asset 
classes delivered superior performance. They also found that pension funds that kept larger 
holdings in private equity outperformed those with small holdings in the 1990s and in the first 
decade of the new millennium. 
 However, a different conclusion is reached by Andonov et al. (2017), who argue that 
higher risk-taking is associated with lower returns. The poor performance of US public pension 
funds is also documented by Hochberg and Rauh (2013), who study overinvestment in local 
private equity projects. Such a local, in-state focus delivered 2‒4 percent lower performance 
than similar out-of-state investments and similar projects within the same state but conducted 
by out-of-state investors. This bias towards ‘politically friendly’ projects reduced public 
pension funds’ resources by $1.2 billion a year. 
The increasing burden of US public pensions over the period 2002‒11 is documented by 
Peng and Wang (2017). They discuss differences across the 50 states and argue that the level 
of employees’ contributions has played an important role in increasing the gap between asset 
values and liabilities. Even though the importance of aligning the level of contributions with 
pension labilities is well documented in the finance literature (see, e.g. Haberman and Sung, 
1994, 2005; Josa-Fombellida and Ricón-Zapatero, 2004, 2006), politicians and policymakers 
are reluctant to see the former increase (see, e.g. Brown et al., 2011; Schieber, 2011). And this 
applies to contributions made both by employees and by employers. 
Any proposed increase in the retirement age or the levels of employees’ contributions, 
or any decrease in retirement benefits, is accompanied by lengthy debate and negotiation. The 
case of CalPERS is illustrative of the problem. Although its funding ratio has been one of the 
lowest in the US (just 68 percent in 2016) and the SB 400 legislation that promised highly 
generous pensions to public sector employees has contributed hugely to this state of affairs, it 
seems virtually impossible that new laws restricting benefits and increasing contributions will 
be passed.15 
There are also problematic incentives in the case of employers’ contributions. Splinter 
(2017) argues that the reduction of contributions made by states significantly contributed to the 
                                                            




level of underfunding of US public pensions. State governments seem to prefer to reduce their 
pension contributions rather than increase taxes or reduce spending.  
In the case of corporate schemes, Davis and de Haan (2012) find that unprofitable and 
smaller Dutch firms contribute less to their pension funds than do profitable and larger firms. 
Moreover, contributions are positively correlated with leverage, suggesting that tax effects play 
a role. Still, Dutch DB schemes are considered to be amongst the best funded and most 
sustainable pension systems in the world (Mercer, 2016; OECD 2016).16 There are several 
potential explanations for this assessment. Tight regulation, further strengthened after the 
collapse of markets following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000‒02, may be one of 
the key factors behind the current strength of the Dutch pensions industry. In particular, Dutch 
regulators’ requirement that pension funds be fully funded at all times has had a significant 
impact on risk-taking and on the asset classes that pension funds have been investing in. It has 
pushed Dutch pension funds towards liability-driven investment (LDI) strategies that hedge 
liabilities against interest rate risk, and has tilted portfolios towards bonds and derivatives, in 
particular swaps. The widespread adoption of LDI strategies turned out to be a good way of 
operating in the low interest rate environment that followed the financial crisis, and had a great 
impact on protecting pension pots in the Netherlands. 
In the case of DC schemes, asset managers are subject to weaker constraints and are, 
when it comes to investment decisions, potentially less influenced by trustees and corporate 
boards than are DB schemes. Therefore, their investment skills and performance may be more 
comparable with those of individual investors. It is commonly claimed that institutional 
investors have better skills and resources, leading to performance that outstrips that of 
individual investors (see, e.g. Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990; Dorn and Huberman 2005; 
Barber and Odean, 2008; Barber et al., 2009; Gennaioli et al., 2015; Guiso and Viviano, 2015). 
Yet, institutional investors, including DC pension funds, are far from perfect in terms of their 
investment abilities, practices and, in particular, treatment of clients. 
The literature on investment practices and the performance of DC pensions overlaps 
heavily with the literature on mutual funds, given that mutual fund research is dominated by 
studies of the US market and 94 percent of American households investing in mutual funds 
treat these investments as pension pots.17 However, parallel to the mutual funds strand of the 
                                                            
16 To be more precise, the Dutch system is a DB–DC hybrid (see Ponds and van Riel, 2007). 
17 According to a survey by the Investment Company Institute, 94 percent of 52.3 million American households 




literature, there also are studies devoted to ‘pure’ pension fund investments, and these will be 
the focus of this section. 
The relatively poor performance of pension fund investments has been documented by 
many (see, e.g. Ippolito and Turner, 1987; Lakonishok et al., 1992; Ambachtsheer et al., 1998; 
Ferson and Khang, 2002; Hinz et al., 2010; Petraki and Zalewska, 2017). The general picture 
issuing from this research is that asset managers are not particularly skilled or hard-working, 
even if they are doing a decent job. The limited ability of contributors to monitor funds’ 
performance adds to the problem. Therefore, although in the case of DC schemes the 
responsibility of sponsors (corporate or public) may not stretch as far as guarantees of 
retirement income, sponsors carry considerable weight in the process of ensuring that 
employees obtain high-quality services from the asset managers running those DC schemes. 
Sialm et al. (2015) and Pool et al. (2016) find that DC sponsors play a crucial role in deciding 
when to include or remove funds from the menu of options available to their employees. They 
also find that sponsors have a preference for keeping funds with good past performance and 
low expenses, contrasting with the literature that shows that individual investors fall prey to 
mutual funds that charge high fees but do not necessarily deliver the quality of performance 
necessary to justify those fees (see, e.g. Alexander et al., 1998; Khorana and Servaes, 2012).  
The protection arising from the market power of employers, even when they are not the 
sponsors of DC schemes, is an important factor affecting the performance of such schemes. 
Zalewska (2017) studies differences in the performance of UK DC schemes offered as group 
personal pensions and those offered as individual personal pension schemes.18 Group personal 
pensions benefit from better monitoring and better investment options. The author shows that 
funds operating under group agreements statistically and economically outperform funds 
operating under individual agreements, have tougher performance benchmarks when there is 
scope for discretion, and are better at tracking these benchmarks. These results show that 
pension providers discriminate against less powerful (in the sense of bargaining power) and 
less knowledgeable individuals in a manner similar to that in which other financial 
intermediaries, like banks and mutual funds, take advantage of their clients (see, e.g. 
Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Christoffersen and Musto, 2002; Collin and Baker, 2005; Houge and 
                                                            
18 Group personal pensions are schemes that are negotiated with a pension provider by an employer for its 
employees, even though the contract is signed by the employees and the provider alone. Employers also oversee 
the performance of these funds, and may change providers if they are unsatisfied with the current provider’s 
performance.  Individual personal pensions are offered directly to individuals by pension providers; no formal 
bodies monitor their performance or negotiate the quality of the contracts on offer. 
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Wellman, 2007; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Versy, 2009; Beck and Brown, 2015; Palia, 2016; Shirley 
and Stark, 2016). Moreover, given that wealth managers’ performance is positively related to 
monitoring pressure (see, e.g. Almazan et al., 2004; James and Karceski, 2006; Adams et al., 
2017), it is particularly important to ensure that proper monitoring is in place if one wishes to 
build trust and increase the wealth of individuals.  
Getting the right incentives in place is another difficulty when attempting to build a 
successful DC system. This applies both to setting appropriate benchmarks and to managerial 
remuneration and career furtherance procedures. The importance of setting benchmarks against 
which to assess performance in a meaningful manner is well documented in the finance 
literature (see, e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1992; Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann, 1999; Dor et 
al., 2003; Chan et al., 2009; Petraki and Zalewska, 2017; Christoffersen and Simutin, 2017). 
However, in the case of pension funds, where long-term performance determines the size of 
retirement pots but short-term assessment is used to remunerate and promote managers, setting 
appropriate benchmarks is even more tricky than it is for mutual fund investments. 
Moreover, it is important to ensure that other types of incentives are also in place. The 
mutual funds literature provides some insight into how investment teams should be structured 
and monitored. And even if mutual funds’ investors differ from pension funds’ investors in 
terms of their investment objectives and the manner in which they invest (see, e.g. Del Guercio 
and Tkac, 2002), the mutual fund literature may provide valuable lessons with regard to 
managerial incentives. 
Given the complexity and size of pension portfolios, one of the central question is whether 
they should be solo- or team-managed. On one hand, one could argue that in solo-managed 
funds there is no scope for free-riding and internal conflicts; team-managed funds, however, 
may benefit from a greater diversity of skills. To add to the confusion, empirical findings are 
divided, with some studies preferring team-managed funds (see, e.g. Prather and Middleton, 
2002; Bliss et al., 2008) while others conclude that solo-management is superior (see, e.g. Chen 
et al., 2004; Bär et al., 2011).  Adams et al. (2017) contribute to this strand of the literature by 
asking under which conditions team-managed funds perform better than solo-managed funds. 
They argue that the quality and extent of the monitoring carried out by the board is fundamental 
to determining the performance of a fund, and that it is not enough to rely solely on the 
increased independence of directors as the ultimate measure of monitoring quality. 
Remuneration is another potential way of addressing the asymmetry of information that 
exists between funds and contributors, although the corporate governance literature provides 
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convincing evidence that remuneration can be as much a cause of agency problems as a solution 
to them.    
Ibert et al. (2017) show that the compensation of mutual fund managers is only very 
weakly related to performance, arguing that compensation is more related to firm-level 
characteristics than to individual talent. Ma et al. (2015) argue that the form of compensation 
matters, showing that managers with performance-linked bonuses exhibit superior fund 
performance, especially when advisors link pay to performance over a longer time period. In 





This paper has brought together the literature on barriers individual investors face when saving 
for old age with that on whether institutional investors have fulfilled their role of supporting 
individuals in their efforts to save for retirement. It complements the articles in this Special 
Issue by providing background to the contributions of the various papers. Several clear 
messages have emerged during the course of this paper, and here we conclude by focusing in 
particular on the three main ones. 
First, it is well documented that there has been a global move towards governments reducing 
their responsibility for, and involvement in, securing retirement income for their citizens, and 
a strong theme in the literature is that the average individual investor is not ready for the role 
that has been assigned to him or her—that is to say, individual investors do not save enough 
for retirement, do not have sufficient appetite for making investment decisions and have poor 
investment skills. Many papers claim that this situation stems from certain features inherent in 
basic individual preferences (e.g. myopia or risk aversion) and from the low level of financial 
literacy and investment skills present amongst individual investors. 
Second, over the last four decades both the number and the scale of institutional investors in 
charge of funded pensions have grown enormously. The aforementioned changes in 
government policy and this growth of institutional investors are obviously in some way 
connected, and each has contributed to the growth in the literature that focuses on the 
characteristics and investment practices of institutional investors. The conclusions drawn from 
this literature are quite pessimistic, regardless of whether the studies are looking at public or at 
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corporate institutional investors, or whether they are assessing DB or DC schemes. The 
literature suggests that institutional investors often fail to deliver good returns, seem to be 
driven by goals that may not be optimal from the perspective of contributors, and even 
discriminate against less financially savvy ones. Institutional investors may, therefore, be a 
long way short of establishing healthy relational contracts and trustworthy relationships with 
their clients. Furthermore, the perceived ‘poor’ practice and performance of institutional 
investors both contribute to the lack of sufficient saving by individuals and to their 
unwillingness to engage in investment activities; so the two problems may be reinforcing one 
another. Thus, the fact that individuals display a certain lethargy with regard to their 
interactions with institutional investors may not be entirely their own fault. 
Third, a large amount of research has been devoted to the question of how to improve this 
situation. It seems that a great deal of work on improving the understanding of financial 
concepts and of the benefits of diversification is needed at the individual investor level. 
Moreover, it seems critical to foster individuals’ awareness of the investment options available. 
The research indicates that a more personalised approach may be the most efficient way of 
reaching out and achieving the desired outcomes. In addition, automatic enrolment, or even 
mandatory contributions, may be the right way forward, given the difficulties individuals 
experience with making and maintaining savings commitments. However, if individuals are to 
be ‘forced’ to save, it is essential that the pension system is sustainable, that institutional 
investors operate in the best interests of individuals, and that individuals are confident that this 
is the case. This suggests a more significant role for regulatory agencies. It is policymakers and 
regulators who must ensure that the existing distortions of incentives are removed or, at least, 
minimised. This may not be an easy task, since it will have to be addressed at the same time as 
dealing with the existing underfunding problem and reshaping existing portfolios. Given the 
scale of pension investments and liabilities, neither of these tasks is likely to be achievable 
without having a significant impact on financial markets. Therefore, more research is needed 
to inform us as to the best way forward. 
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